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Enforcing the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments
GENE S. MARTIN, JR. AND JAMES W. BRENNAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its preamble, the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling' (ICRW) states that it desires "to establish a system of interna-
tional regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective
conservation and development of whale stocks."' To help achieve this ob-
jective the ICRW included a Schedule with specific regulations relating to
the conservation and utilization of whale resources. The ICRW also cre-
ated the International Whaling Commission (IWC)s and empowered it to
amend the Schedule by adopting regulations for the conservation and
utilization of whale resources.4 In exercising this authority, the IWC may,
among other things, identify protected species, establish whaling seasons,
open and closed water areas, set size limits, whaling methods and catch
quotas."
None of these regulations are necessarily binding on any nation, how-
ever, under the ICRW or as a matter of international law. Article V of the
ICRW allows each member to register an objection to any regulation
amending the Schedule. Once an objection to a regulation has been duly
filed with the IWC, the regulation is not effective as to the objecting
member. Although all non-objecting members remain bound by a regula-
tion, there are no sanctioning or enforcement powers provided by the
ICRW.
* Gene S. Martin, Jr. is an Attorney-Advisor in the Office of General Counsel, at the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Commerce;
James W. Brennan is Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA, Department of Com-
merce (formerly Deputy General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, NOAA). The authors
wish to thank Dean Swanson and Becky Rootes of the National Marine Fisheries Service for
their assistance in preparing this article. The views, opinions, and statements in this article
are the authors' own, and do not necessarily represent the views, opinions, or statements of
the Department of Commerce or the United States Government.
1. Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 (entered into force
Nov. 10, 1948). The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling [hereinafter
ICRW] is implemented in U.S. law in Whaling Convention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 951 (1985).
2. Id. at Preamble.
3. ICRW, Art. III.
4. ICRW, Art V. Art III of the ICRW requires a three-fourths majority vote for any
action taken pursuant to Art. V. All other decisions of the IWC require only a simple
majority.
5. Id.
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The United States, on the other hand, has two laws that give author-
ity to the executive branch to sanction any nation that may violate the
policies and objectives of the ICRW's conservation program - the Pelly
Amendment0 (hereinafter referred to only as the "Pelly Amendment") to
the Fishermen's Protective Act 7 passed in 1971 and the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment s (hereinafter referred to only as the "Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment") to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act 9 (Magnuson Act) passed in 1979.
This article discusses the origins, provisions and interpretations of
the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and
their applicability to the ICRW conservation program for whales. It also
reviews the certifications and sanctions that have occurred regarding
whaling by other nations with emphasis on recent decisions concerning
research whaling of Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea and Iceland.
II. PELLY AND PACKWOOD-MAGNUSON AMENDMENTS
The primary tools available to the United States government to en-
courage other countries to comply with ICRW conservation policies and
objectives are the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment. These amendments establish a process known as certifica-
tion which occurs when the Secretary of Commerce determines that na-
tionals of a country are engaged in whaling operations which diminish the
effectiveness of the ICRW. Once a country has been certified under this
process, certain sanctions are possible. Under the Pelly Amendment the
sanctions reside solely within the discretion of the President, whereas
under Packwood-Magnuson, sanctions are required to be imposed by the
Secretary of State. The provisions of both amendments and their origins
are discussed below. A description of the application of these amend-
ments to particular situations is discussed in subsequent sections.
A. Origins and Provisions of the Pelly Amendment
In 1969, the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries 0 (ICNAF) banned Atlantic high seas salmon fishing because of
a growing threat to that population of fish. Three members of ICNAF,
Denmark, Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany objected to the
ban and under the terms of ICNAF were free to ignore the terms of the
ban without breaching the terms of the ICNAF. Denmark's failure to
6. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (Supp. 1988) (codified as amended at P.L. No. 100-711 (Nov. 23,
1988)).
7. 22 U.S.C. § 1971 (1979 & Supp. 1988).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(1985).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1985 & Supp. 1988)
10. ICNAF was composed of 15 nations at the time, including the United States, bor-
dering the North Atlantic Ocean or actively engaged in fishing in those waters. Its purpose
was to conserve fishing resources in the Northwest Atlantic at level which would permit the
maximum sustained catch. The ICNAF is no longer in existence.
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comply with the ban, particularly, effectively nullified any benefits that
would come from the ban.
To address this situation, Congressman Pelly of Washington intro-
duced a bill" to amend the Fishermen's Protective Act intended primar-
ily to protect North Atlantic salmon from depletion by Danish fishermen.
After hearings, the bill was expanded to include the protection of all spe-
cies of fish, including whales, and any international fishery conservation
program. The bill, which became known as the Pelly Amendment, was
signed into law on December 23, 1971.2 Ironically, neither the statutory
language or House and Senate Committee Reports mentions whaling or
the ICRW which has become the main focus of Pelly Amendment
considerations.
The Pelly Amendment states that when the Secretary of Commerce
determines nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are con-
ducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which di-
minish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program,
the Secretary shall certify" such determination to the President of the
United States."'
Upon receipt of such certification, the President may direct the Sec-
retary of Treasury to prohibit the importation into the United States of
fish products1" of the offending country for such duration as he deter-
mines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." Within 60
11. H.R. 3304, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
12. Pub. L. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971).
13. This is done by letter from the Secretary of Commerce to the President.
14. 22 U.S.C. §1978(a)(1) (1979).
15. "Fish Products" was originally defined in the Pelly Amendment to mean "fish and
marine mammals and all products thereof taken by fishing, vessels of an offending country
whether or not packed, processed or within the jurisdiction thereof." 22 U.S.C. §1978(h)(4)
(Supp. 1988)(as amended at Pub. L. 100-78 (Nov. 23, 1988)), and now reads: "any aquatic
species (including marine mammals and plants) and all products thereof exported from an
offending country, or packed, processed, or otherwise prepared for export in such country or
within the jurisdiction thereof." The purpose of this change was to expand the President's
options in deciding which products to embargo. In the original definition the President was
restricted to embargoing fish and products thereof that were taken by vessels of the offend-
ing nation. To determine what products coming into the United States were taken by the
offending nation was seen by Congress to be a difficult or impossible task that would make
it less likely that the President could decide upon a workable embargo to impose against an
offending country. Accordingly, Congress struck the restriction regarding fish products
taken by the vessels of an offending country and substituted the present language allowing
any fish product coming from the offending country.
16. 22 U.S.C. §1978(a)(4) (1971). Article XX of GATT provides for imposition of trade
measures against member nations if it justifiably relates to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources. The House Report accompanying the original Pelly Amendment states
that Article XX does not limit the President to declaring an embargo on only the kind of
fish product that is being caught in violation of an international fishery conservation pro-
gram. H.R. Rep. No. 92-468, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2414. Whether this is an appropriate interpretation has never been directly
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days following certification, the President is required to notify the Con-
gress 1 7 of any action taken by him pursuant to such certification. 8 In the
event the President fails to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to pro-
hibit the importation of fish products of the offending country, or if such
prohibition does not cover all fish products of the offending country, the
President is required to inform the Congress of the reasons of such course
of action.'9
In 1978, the Pelly Amendment was amended 0 by the addition of 22
U.S.C. § 1978(a)(2) which expands the scope of its provisions to situations
where the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of Interior finds that
nationals of a foreign country are engaging in "trade or taking" of "wild-
life products" which diminishes the effectiveness of any international
conservation program2 ' for endangered or threatened species. Once a
country is certified under this provision, the President is given the same
discretion to impose sanctions as he has under the original Pelly Amend-
ment Provision"2 except that the products that can be embargoed include
any kind of "wildlife product. '23 This expanded provision could be used
against a member nation of IWC, for example, if the Secretary of Com-
merce determined that the nation was engaged in the trade of whale meat
which violated the ICRW. Under the original provision of the Pelly
Amendment, the mere trading of whale meat would not necessarily trig-
ger the Pelly Amendment because it arguably would not involve "fishing
operations."
The Pelly Amendment was again amended in 1979 with the additions
of 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(3) and (d).2 4 Section (a)(3) requires the Secretaries
of Commerce and Interior to monitor, investigate and act upon any activ-
ities of a foreign nation that may be a cause for a certification and
promptly conclude whether certification is necessary. Section (d) pro-
vides for the termination of certification if the reasons for the certifica-
tion no longer prevail.
The Pelly Amendment was most recently amended on November 23,
1988 by Pub. L. 100-711 which expands the definition of "fish product[s]"
tested.
17. This is done by an open letter to the congress from the President.
18. 22 U.S.C. §1978(b)(1979).
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. 95-376, §2, 92 Stat. 714 (Sept. 18, 1978).
21. Legislative history indicates that the major international conservation agreement
contemplated by the amendment is the Convention of International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature March 3,1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087,
T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
22. 22 U.S.C. §1978 (a)(1) (Supp. 1988).
23. "Wildlife product" is defined in 22 U.S.C. §1978(h)(6) as "fish and wild animals,
and parts (including eggs) taken within a offending country and all products of any such fish
and wild animals ...."
24. Pub. L. 96-61, §3(b), 93 Stat. 408 (1979). This amendment was actually part of the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Act.
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that can be subject to trade prohibitions.
B. Origins and Provisions of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
By 1979, almost eight years after the passage of the Pelly Amend-
ment, the President had never imposed any trade sanctions on nations
that were found to have diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW. Some
members of Congress felt that the sanctions process was so protracted
and discretionary as to be inadequate to ensure prompt reaction from the
United States for unacceptable whaling activities by other nations.2 5 Ac-
cordingly, Senator Packwood successfully proposed an amendment to the
Magnuson Act co-sponsored by Senator Magnuson aimed solely at the
ICRW which required automatic sanctions against certified foreign na-
tions which had fishing allocations granted under the Magnuson Act.2" By
requiring an automatic sanction, the supporters of this legislation felt
that the United states could more effectively and swiftly encourage whal-
ing nations to comply with ICRW objectives.
Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, certification is defined
to mean a finding by the Secretary of Commerce that nationals of a for-
eign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations or
engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of the
ICRW.27 A certification under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment shall
also be deemed a certification under the Pelly Amendment.28
If such a certification is issued by the Secretary of Commerce, then
the actual or proposed allocation2" of fishing privileges in U.S. waters
under the Magnuson Act to the offending nation shall be reduced by the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, by
not less than 50 per cent.3" If the condition that certification was designed
to remedy remains uncorrected after 365 days, no further allocations may
be made to the offending nation and those that are in effect (after the 50
per cent or more reduction) shall be rescinded. 1 The Amendment pro-
vides for restoration of rights to receive allocations of fishing privileges
only after termination of certification.2
25. See 125 Cong. Rec. 22083-22084 (Aug. 2, 1979) (statements of Reps. Murphy and
Oberstar).
26. Pub. L. 96-61, §3(a), 93 Stat. 407 (Aug. 15, 1979). The Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment also amended the Pelly Amendment by adding section (a)(3) and section (d).
See supra note 24, and accompanying text.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1985).
28. Id.
29. Allocations to foreign fishing fleets to fish in what is now the U.S. Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone is possible only if the foreign nation has entered into a "[Gloverning interna-
tional fishery agreement" (GIFA). If the offending nation has not yet received an allocation
but would receive one, except for certification within the next 365 days, then that allocation
is also subject to reduction. 16 U.S.C. §1821(e)(2)(B) (1985).
30. Id.
31. 16 U.S.C. §1821(e)(2)(D) (1985).
32. 16 U.S.C. §1821(e)(2)(C)(iii) (1985).
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III. HISTORY OF CERTIFICATION DECISIONS
Since the Pelly Amendment was passed into law the United States
has certified foreign countries nine times for diminishing the effectiveness
of the ICRW. Of these nine certifications, two were also certifications
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. In addition to actually cer-
tifying a country, the United States has threatened or considered certifi-
cation several more times. No Pelly Amendment sanctions have ever been
imposed; Packwood-Magnuson sanctions were imposed as required by law
for the two certifications occurring under that law. These certifications
and threatened certifications can be divided into two time periods: pre-
1982 and 1982 to the present. This discussion briefly reviews pre-1982
decisions and then discusses more completely decisions since 1982.
A. Brief Review of Certification Decisions - 1971-1982
Almost every situation in which the United States considered certify-
ing a country under the Pelly Amendment has involved international
whaling matters. The exception occurred immediately after the notable
passage of the Pelly Amendment when the United States threatened
Denmark, Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany with the appli-
cation of the Amendment in order to secure an agreement on their part to
end Atlantic high seas salmon fishing in 1976.
Between the years 1971 and 1982, most considerations concerning
certification involved the actions or intentions of whaling nations not to
comply with various quotas on the numbers of whales to be taken and the
types of methods used. Although the anti-whaling sentiment of the envi-
ronmentalists was gaining momentum during this period, certification de-
cisions did not attract the intense scrutiny of the environmental commu-
nity that exists now.
In 1974, Japan and the U.S.S.R. became the first countries certified
under the Pelly Amendment. At its 1973 IWC meeting, the IWC adopted
a quota of 5,000 Southern Hemisphere minke whales for the 1973/74 pe-
lagic and 1974 coastal whaling seasons.3 3 As allowed under the ICRW,
Japan and the U.S.S.R. filed objections to the quota.4 Subsequently, So-
viet nationals took 4,000 minke whales and the Japanese took 3,713,
thereby in combination exceeding the total quota established by the IWC.
In the absence of any firm assurance that Japan and the USSR would not
continue to exceed the IWC quota, the Secretary of Commerce certified
both countries in November 12, 1974.23 The President decided not to im-
pose sanctions because by the time the President had reported to Con-
33. Report, 25th Report of the Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., at 7 (1974) [hereinafter
IWC 25:7].
34. Id.
35. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent to President Gerald Ford (Nov.
12, 1974).
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gress both countries agreed to strengthened conservation measures.3 6
The next Pelly Amendment certification occurred on December 14,
1978, against Chile, Peru and the Republic of Korea. 37 Chilean and Peru-
vian whalers had been taking whales in excess of IWC whaling quotas
since at least the 1975/76 pelagic whaling season and Korean whalers had
exceeded IWC quotas since the 1976 coastal whaling season. During this
time, none of these countries belonged to the IWC. Early in 1978, the
U.S. government contacted the governments of these three nations and
informed them of possible Pelly Amendment actions against them. Subse-
quently, all three nations began steps to join the IWC. The Secretary of
Commerce, nevertheless, certified the three nations, concluding that they
had been conducting whaling operations in a manner and under circum-
stances that diminished the effectiveness of the IWC. The President, in
his required report to Congress, refrained from imposing sanctions be-
cause all three nations had either joined or taken steps to join the IWC,
thereby subjecting the future activities of their nationals to the IWC con-
servation program.
Between 1978 and 1982, no other nation was certified, but several
were threatened with certification under the Pelly Amendment and for
the first time the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment if their nationals did
not comply with the ICRW. In 1979, the IWC established for the first
time a quota for the Spain-Portugal-British Isles population of fin whales
in the North Atlantic. 8 Spain, a new member of the IWC, objected to
this quota on behalf of its nationals who historically exceeded the quota."
In 1980, during bilateral consultations with Spain, the United States ad-
vised Spain of the potential applicability of the Pelly Amendment and
the newly passed Packwood-Magnuson Amendment if Spanish nationals
failed to comply with IWC quotas. At that time Spanish nationals had
received fishing allocations under the Magnuson Act which were subject
to the automatic Packwood-Magnuson sanction. Spanish whalers subse-
quently complied with the IWC quota.
In 1980, Korea objected 0 to an IWC resolution banning the use of
the cold harpoon." After consultations between the United States and
Korea in which the applicability of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments were discussed, Korea withdrew its objection and appar-
ently abided by the resolution. During this same time period, the United
States advised Taiwan, a non-member of the IWC, of the applicability of
36. Report from President Gerald Ford to Congress (Jan. 16, 1975).
37. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps to President Jimmy Carter (Dec.
14, 1977).
38. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep. (1979-80); Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep. 31:6 (1981).
39. Id.
40. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 1980-81, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 32nd Mtg., para. 5
(1982).
41. The cold harpoon is one without an explosive charge in the harpoon head. The use
of the cold harpoon minimizes damage to the whale meat but is considered to be inhumane.
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the both amendments after verifying that Taiwan nationals in the late
1970's had taken whales in excess of IWC quotas and using methods
banned by the IWC. Shortly thereafter, Taiwan restricted its whaling ves-
sels to their home port and in July, 1981 banned whaling.42
B. Certification Decisions - 1982 to Present
Since 1982, virtually every certification decision has been related to
the moratorium on commercial whaling beginning in the 1985/86 whaling
season, or to scientific research whaling conducted by nations that op-
posed the moratorium. To understand the context of certification deci-
sions during this period some background is necessary.
During the 1970's and early 1980's, the IWC was becoming increas-
ingly sensitive to environmental concerns about the status of the world's
whale populations."3 This concern culminated in 1982 when the IWC es-
tablished a moratorium on all commercial whaling to take effect in the
1985/86 whaling season and continue at least through 1990."" The IWC
agreed to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the de-
cision to establish a moratorium on commercial whaling by 1990."'
The 1982 moratorium decision was opposed by several of the major
whaling nations still operating at the time including U.S.S.R., Japan and
Norway. All of these nations filed timely objections to the moratorium
and were therefore not bound by it under the terms of the ICRW.46
During the time period, several nations with a history of whaling be-
gan considering fairly extensive scientific research programs calling for
the lethal take of whales. Under Article VIII of the ICRW, the killing,
taking and treating of whales for scientific purposes is expressly exempt
from the operation of the ICRW, including quotas and the moratorium on
commercial whaling. Nations are free to determine the number of whales
to be taken as well as any other conditions or restrictions deemed neces-
sary by the nation for the research. Paragraph 30 of the IWC Schedule,
however, does require each nation to submit proposed scientific research
permits to the IWC in time to allow the IWC's Scientific Committee47 to
review and comment on the permits.4
42. The banning of whaling by Taiwan came after discussions with the U.S. and Japan
concerning the sale of whale meat by Taiwan to Japan. Japan had been a major purchaser of
whale meat caught by Taiwan whaling vessels. At one point the IWC was considering asking
its members to not buy any whale meat from Taiwan to encourage it to refrain from its
whaling practices in violation of the IWC conservation program.
43. This change of emphasis mirrored the rising tide of concern for all aspects of the
environment in the United States and worldwide. Whales became a touchstone for the envi-
ronmental movement and, as a result, IWC member countries were the targets of increasing
political pressure from environmental groups to cease whaling.
44. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 10(e) (Dec. 1988)(schedule).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The Scientific Committee is composed of scientists appointed by member nations.
48. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 30 (Dec.1988) (schedule).
VOL. 17:2
PELLY AND PACKWOOD-MAGNUSON AMENDMENTS
At this time the environmental community and others became con-
cerned that research whaling would be used as a guise for commercial
whaling in order to circumvent the moratorium. In response to these con-
cerns, the IWC adopted resolutions in 1986"' and 198710 setting out
guidelines, recommendations and criteria concerning research whaling
and the propriety of allowing research whaling to occur when it does not
satisfy the criteria. These resolutions were proposed pursuant to Article
VI of the ICRW which provides that the IWC may make recommenda-
tions to member nations on any matters which relate to whales or
whaling.
This backdrop served as the context within which certification deci-
sions since 1982 have been considered. During this time the United States
has made significant decisions concerning certification of Japan, U.S.S.R.,
Norway, Republic of Korea and Iceland." These certification decisions,
which were all highly scrutinized by the environmental community, col-
lectively reflect the present status of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments.
1. Japan
Japan presents an interesting case involving certification because the
Secretary of Commerce considered certifying Japan, but did not, in 1984
for commercial whaling operations. The Secretary certified Japan in 1987
for its scientific research whaling program. Moreover, the 1984 decision
not to certify Japan resulted in U.S. Supreme Court review in the case of
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,5 which established
an important precedent concerning the discretionary latitude of the Sec-
49. The resolution included guidelines urging nations to structure the research so that
it would limit the need for lethal research and contribute to regional management of stocks
and facilitate the conduct of the comprehensive assessment. In addition, the resolution rec-
ommended that whale meat and other whale products obtained through research projects
should be utilized primarily for local consumption.
50. The United States led the successful efforts to win adoption of this resolution. The
resolution requests that the Scientific Committee review all research programs and report
its views as to whether the programs satisfy the criteria in the 1986 resolution and addi-
tional criteria relating to whether the research addresses questions that should be answered
to conduct the comprehensive assessment or other critical research needs. The research can
be conducted without adversely affecting the overall status and trends of stocks in question.
It also addresses questions that cannot be answered by existing data or non-lethal research
and the research is likely to yield reliable answers to questions being addressed. The resolu-
tion also calls on the IWC to notify a nation if a proposed program does not to meet the
applicable criteria beginning with the 40th IWC meeting in 1989, and recommends that
nations refrain from issuing permits that the IWC considers do not satisfy the applicable
criteria.
51. Chile was also considered for certification during this time period. Chile objected to
the IWC's 1982 zero quota for the Eastern South Pacific stock of Bryde's whales for the
1983 season. The United States agreed not to certify Chile on its assurances that it would
allow only modest whaling in 1983 as a transition to implementing a moratorium thereafter.
52. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 105 C. St. 2860
(1986).
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retary of Commerce in deciding whether to certify a nation under the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.
a. 1984 Decision and Japanese Whaling Ass'n
In 1982, the IWC effectively established a zero harvest quota for a
stock of sperm whales fished by the Japanese for the 1983/84 pelagic sea-
son.5 3 The IWC, also established in 1982 its moratorium on all commer-
cial whaling to begin in 1985/86 pelagic season.5 4 Japan filed a timely ob-
jection to the moratorium and the sperm whale quota.55
As the 1984-1985 whaling season approached, it became apparent
that if Japan allowed its national to harvest sperm whales for the next
season it would be exceeding the reinstated zero quota for sperm whales.
The United States informed Japan that the taking of sperm whales in
1984 could result in certification under the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments. Japan and the United States then entered into
extensive negotiations that culminated on November 13, 1984 in an exec-
utive agreement. It was evidenced by an exchange of letters between the
Charge d' Affaires of the Japanese Embassy and the Secretary of Com-
merce. According to the terms of the agreement, Japan agreed to with-
draw its objections to the moratorium" and the sperm whale quota,5 7 to
adhere to certain harvest limits of sperm and other whales in 1984-19871"
and to cease all commercial whaling by 1988. In return, the Secretary of
Commerce determined that Japan's whaling activities, as stipulated in
the executive agreement, would not diminish the effectiveness of the
ICRW or its conservation program and therefore, the Secretary would not
certify Japan under either amendment so long as Japan abided by its
commitments.
Before the executive agreement was finalized, several wildlife conser-
vation groups, led by the American Cetacean Society, filed suit in U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, among other things,"
a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of Commerce to certify Ja-
pan. The district court granted summary judgment on grounds that any
taking of whales in violation of IWC quotas diminishes the effectiveness
of the ICRW and the court ordered the Secretary immediately to certify
53. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.IWC Report, 1982-83, RIWC 34:5 (1984).
54. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 10(e) (Dec. 1988) (schedule).
55. Id.
56. This was to be done by April 1, 1985 effective on April 1, 1988.
57. This was to be done by December 13, 1984 effective on April 1, 1988.
58. The agreement stipulated that 400 sperm whales could be harvested in 1984 and
1985 and that 200 sperm whales could be taken in 1986 and 1987 without triggering certifi-
cation. In addition, other species of whale could be taken, after consultation with the United
States, through the 1986-1987 pelagic whaling season and the 1987 coastal whaling season.
59. Plaintiffs also were requesting (1) a declaratory judgment that the Secretary's fail-
ure to certify violated both the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ment; and (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting any executive agreement which would
violate the certification and sanction requirements of the two amendments.
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to the President that Japan was in violation of the sperm whale quota.60
After this judgment, Japan informed the Secretary of Commerce that it
would withdraw its objection to the whaling moratorium, as promised in
the executive agreement, only if the United States obtained reversal of
the district court's order.
6
'
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, 2-1,
the district court order holding that the taking by Japanese national of
whales in excess of IWC quotas automatically called for certification.6 2
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Japanese Whaling Ass'n, reversed the
appellate court in a 5-4 decision written by Justice White. The major is-
sue addressed by the Court was whether the Secretary of Commerce was
mandated by either the Pelly or Packwood-Magnuson Amendments to
certify Japan because its nationals were exceeding ICRW quotas.6 3 The
Court held that neither the language nor the legislative history of these
amendments require the Secretary to certify a nation merely because its
nationals are violating a ICRW quota. The Court found reasonable the
Secretary's construction of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ments that there are circumstances in which certification may be with-
held despite departures from the schedules of the ICRW. 64 In this regard,
the Court held that the Secretary could reasonably conclude that " 'a
cessation of all Japanese whaling activities would contribute more to the
effectiveness of the IWC and its conservation program than any other sin-
gle development.'"65
In further support of its decision, the Court cited legislative history
regarding the Pelly Amendment, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
and the 1978 amendment to the Pelly Amendment. The 1978 amendment
established a certification process for the trade or the taking of wildlife
products in violation of a conservation program for endangered or
threatened species.6 6 In the House Committee Report of the 1978 amend-
ment to the Pelly Amendment, the Court found that Congress intended
there to be a range of discretion in determining what diminishes the ef-
fectiveness of an international conservation program. 7 The Court also
60. American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1411 (D.D.C.
1985).
61. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. at 2865.
62. American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
63. Japanese Whaling Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. at 2867. The Court also briefly considered and
rejected petitioner Japanese Whaling Ass'n's contention that the present actions were un-
suitable for judicial review because they involved foreign relations and a federal court lacked
judicial power to order the Executive Branch to dishonor and repudiate an international
agreement. Id. at 2865-2866.
64. Japanese Whaling Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 2867.
65. Id. at 2872 (quoting from Affidavit of Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige,
Brief for Petitioners in No. 85-955, Addendum III, pp. 6A-7A).
66. Id. at 2868-2870.
67. Id. at 2869-2870 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1029 at 15, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1779).
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noted the House Committee Report's endorsement of the Secretary's de-
cisions not to certify Peru and Korea in 1978 despite their violations of
IWC quotas as additional evidence of Congressional intent not to estab-
lish a per se rule of certification."
Although holding that the Secretary has discretion in deciding when
to certify, the Court recognized such discretion is not unlimited and that
the Secretary could probably not refuse certification for reasons not con-
nected with the aims of the conservation goals of the IWC or when mem-
ber nations are deliberately flouting Schedules without objecting to
them." Nevertheless, this decision establishes that the Secretary has con-
siderable latitude to withhold certification as an enticement to effect re-
sults favorable to the conservation objectives of the IWC.
b. 1988 Certification
Since the Supreme Court decision, Japan, in the opinion of the Sec-
retary of Commerce, has abided by the executive agreement regarding
commercial whaling.70 Japan was certified, however, in 1988, for con-
ducting a research whaling program as discussed below.
For the 1987 IWC annual meeting, Japan submitted to the IWC Sci-
entific Committee a scientific research whaling program focusing on
Southern Hemisphere minke whales.71 The proposal stated that approxi-
mately 825 minke whales and 50 sperm whales would be lethally taken in
late 1987 and early 1988. Some members of the Scientific Committee
found uncertainties with the proposed program which were included in a
report submitted to the IWC. 72 Based on the Scientific Committee's re-
68. Id. at 2870, n.7.
69. Id. at 2868.
70. On September 23, 1987, the original plaintiffs in this case attempted to reopen the
case by filing a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b) in district court. Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment in instances such
as newly discovered evidence and fraud. Plaintiffs claimed, in essence, that the executive
agreement on which the Secretary of Commerce relied in not certifying Japan was invalid
because Japan misrepresented its intentions to stop commercial whaling. This misrepresen-
tation was evidenced, according to plaintiffs, in Japan's stated intent in 1987 to engage in
scientific whaling which plaintiff's contended was only a sham for commercial whaling. The
plaintiffs further argued that since the executive agreement was invalid, the Supreme
Court's decision should be reconsidered because it was based on the validity of the executive
agreement. The district court denied plaintiffs motion, holding that plaintiffs contentions
were speculative since Japan had not yet stated scientific whaling and, in any event, the
Supreme Court decision did not hinge upon the Japan's representations regarding the exec-
utive agreement but rather upon whether the Secretary of Commerce had discretion to con-
sider alternatives to certification to achieve compliance with the ICRW. American Cetacean
Society v. Bruce Smart, No. 84-3414 (D.D.C. November 18, 1987).
71. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg. (1987). See also Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.,
Report of the Scientific Committee, 39th Mtg. at 48-53 (1987). The program was designed
to obtain estimates of the biological parameters required for stock management, principally
age-specific natural mortality rates and to obtain estimates of various reproductive
parameters.
72. See supra note 71.
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port, the IWC adopted a non-binding resolution"s stating the view that
Japan's research proposal did not satisfy applicable criteria suggested in
the 1986 resolution concerning scientific research whaling. The resolution
also recommended that Japan not issue the special permit for the pro-
gram until the serious uncertainties in the program identified by the Sci-
entific Committee have been resolved to the satisfaction of that Commit-
tee. However, since the resolution was non-binding, Japan was not
obligated under the ICRW to follow the recommendations."'
After the conclusion of the 1987 IWC annual meeting, Japan submit-
ted a revised research program to the IWC, which most notably reduced
the number of lethal takes of minke whales to approximately 300.11 In
December, 1987, the Scientific Committee held a special meeting to re-
view the revised program. The report of the Committee reveals that Ja-
pan had not resolved all of the original uncertainties to the satisfaction of
the entire Committee." The United Kingdom then introduced a resolu-
tion again recommending that Japan not conduct research until the un-
certainties had been resolved. This non-binding resolution, which the
United States supported, was passed by postal vote on February 14,
1988./
Before the conclusion of the postal vote, Japan issued a special per-
mit to conduct research whaling and Japanese nationals took their first
whales under the permit in late January, 1988. Based on these circum-
stances, the Secretary of Commerce, on February 9, 1988, certified to the
President under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, that
nationals of Japan were conducting whaling operations that diminished
the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program. In certifying Japan,
the Secretary specifically considered the fact that Japan's actions came
on the heels of pertinent resolutions. It also considered actions taken by
the IWC including the 1987 general resolution establishing guidelines for
approving scientific programs, the specific resolution recommending that
Japan not issue the permit and the Scientific Committee's generally unfa-
vorable review of the revised program.
As a result of the certification under the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment, Japan was automatically subject to at least a 50% reduction
in directed fishing allocations. Consistent with the decision of the Presi-
dent in his report to Congress on April 6, 1988,7 required by the Pelly
Amendment, the Secretary of State withheld 100 per cent of Japan's rec-
73. Int'l Whaling Comm'n 39th Mtg., para. 45 (1987). This type of resolution is not
considered a regulation or amendment to the ICRW Schedule and therefore was non-bind-
ing as to Japan whether or not Japan voted against or objected to it.
74. Id.
75. Int'l Whaling Comm'n 39th Mtg. (1987).
76. See Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting Governments from
the Secretary to the Commission, RG/VHJ/16800 (Dec. 22, 1988).
77. See id.
78. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Congress (April 6, 1988).
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ommended fishing allocations 79 and committed to withholding any future
allocations so long as the reasons that gave rise to the certification
prevailed.
The President decided to withhold imposition of trade restrictions
under the Pelly Amendment, however. The President based this decision
on his view that the "immediate and prospective effects of a 100 percent
reduction of fishing allocations, coupled with Presidential review in the
near future, is the most effective means of encouraging Japan to embrace
the IWC conservation program.""0 The President then directed the Secre-
tary of Commerce in cooperation with the Secretary of State to monitor
the situation and report back to him no later than December 1, 1988 if
further action was needed.
The Secretary of Commerce reported on December 1, 1988, to the
President that there had been no significant change in the circumstances
that led to the certification."1 The Secretary added that he would be
sending recommendations as to additional steps that could be taken to
encourage Japan to embrace the IWC conservation program.
2. U.S.S.R.
The certification of the U.S.S.R. is noteworthy because it is one of
only two countries that have been sanctioned under the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment; and it is the only country for which a certifica-
tion has been terminated pursuant to Pelly Amendment provisions.
The U.S.S.R. originally objected to the IWC 1982 decision to estab-
lish a moratorium on commercial whaling to begin in the 1985-86 whaling
season and to a specific quota on the take of Southern Hemisphere minke
whales for the 1984-85 season.82 On April 1, 1985, the Secretary of Com-
merce certified the U.S.S.R. under the Pelly and Packwood Magnuson
Amendments citing the following reasons: The Soviet harvest of Southern
Hemisphere minke whales was greater than the level the United States
considered to be the Soviet's share; the 1984-85 IWC quota for these
whales was exceeded due to the Soviet harvest; and, there had been no
indication that the U.S.S.R. intended to comply with IWC standards, in-
cluding the commercial whaling moratori ums3
Effective April 1, 1985, Soviet-directed fishing allocations were re-
duced by the 50 percent minimum required under the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment. A complete prohibition on fishing allocations to
79. At the time, Japan had requested 3,000 metric tons of sea snails and 5,000 metric
tons of Pacific whiting,
80. Supra note 78.
81. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(Dec. 1, 1988).
82. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 10(e)(Dec. 1988) (schedule); Int'l Whaling
Comm'n Rep., Chairman's Report of the 35th. Annual Meeting (1985).
83. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to President Ronald Reagan
(April 1, 1985).
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the U.S.S.R. became effective on April 1, 1986 as required under the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment because the U.S.S.R. had not corrected
the situation leading to the certification.
No Pelly Amendment sanctions were imposed at the discretion of the
President as expressed in his report to Congress on May 31, 1984.84 In
recommending no Pelly sanctions, the President stated that trade sanc-
tions against Soviet fish products would not aid other efforts to change
Soviet whaling policy. The President reasoned that a trade embargo
would have little effect because most Soviet fish products being imported
were highly marketable elsewhere. He also indicated that U.S. fishing in-
terest could be seriously harmed because an embargo could lead to the
dissolution of U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint ventures. The President further pointed
out that the United States was encouraging Japan to stop buying whale
meat from the U.S.S.R..
On April 14, 1988, the Secretary of Commerce terminated the certifi-
cation of the U.S.S.R. pursuant to the Pelly Amendment. 5 This termina-
tion came about after a series of discussions and letters between the two
countries following the U.S.S.R.'s announcement that it had ceased all
commercial whaling in the Spring of 1987. After receiving assurances
from the U.S.S.R. that it would not resume commercial whaling until
such whaling can be conducted without jeopardizing the well-being of
whale populations; and that the U.S.S.R. will work through the IWC for
research and whale conservation, the Secretary of Commerce concluded
that the reasons leading to certification no longer prevailed and, there-
fore, termination of the certification was appropriate under the Pelly
Amendment.
3. Norway
Norway was certified in 1986 under the Pelly Amendment for com-
mercial whaling activities and considered for an additional certification in
1988 for its whale research program. The U.S. decision not to certify Nor-
way for its whale research program is of particular interest as it compares
to the decision to certify Japan for its research program.
a. 1986 Certification
The 1986 certification of Norway arose out of Norway's taking of
minke whales from the northeastern and central stocks in the north At-
lantic for which the IWC had established zero quotas by virtue of the
moratorium. Norway had timely objected to the moratorium, thereby ex-
empting itself from any treaty obligations to abide by it."
84. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Congress (May 31, 1985).
85. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(April 14, 1988).
86. ICRW, Schedule, Para. 10(e)(Dec. 1988). In 1982, the United States entered into
discussions with Norway searching for a means by which Norway could withdraw its objec-
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In 1986, Norway informed the United States that it had unilaterally
authorized domestic quotas for 350 northeastern Atlantic stock and 50
central Atlantic stock minke whales Shortly thereafter, the United States
learned that Norway had begun whaling pursuant to these quotas.
On June 9, 1987, the Secretary certified Norway under the Pelly
Amendment stating that the IWC zero quota for two stocks of minke
whales in the north Atlantic had been exceeded as a result of the harvest
of Norway.87 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was not at issue be-
cause Norway was not eligible for fish allocations in U.S. waters under the
Magnuson Act.
On July 3, 1986, Norway announced that it would suspend commer-
cial whaling after the 1987 coastal whaling season and would reduce the
domestic quota for 1987 to a number less than the 1986 quota of 400. But
it did not withdraw its objection to the moratorium. On August 4, 1986,
the President reported to Congress, as required by the Pelly Amendment,
that no trade sanctions would be imposed at that time because the Nor-
wegian announcement on July 3, 1986 contemplated compliance, even
though delayed, with the IWC zero quotas and the effectiveness of the
IWC depends upon such actions of voluntary compliance."8 The President
stressed that the decision not to impose trade sanctions hinged on Nor-
way's commitment not to resume commercial whaling after the 1987
whaling season. The President further stated that certification of Norway
would continue until Norway withdrew its objection to the moratorium or
until the IWC authorized a resumption of Norwegian commercial whal-
ing. The President then charged the Secretary of Commerce in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of State to monitor Norwegian whaling activities
during the period of certification and send additional recommendations
as may be warranted.
b. 1988 Consideration of Certification
Since the end of the 1987 whaling season, Norway has not engaged in
commercial whaling activities, but it has not withdrawn its objection to
the commercial whaling moratorium. It did, however, in 1988, engage in a
scientific research program calling for the lethal take of minke whales
that resulted in an consideration by the Secretary of Commerce as to the
need to certify Norway again.
At the 1988 IWC annual meeting, Norway submitted to the IWC Sci-
entific Committee a proposed research program calling for the lethal take
of 30 minke whales and the non-lethal anesthetization of 5 minke
tions to the moratorium so as to avoid certification in the event Norway took whales in
contravention to the moratorium or other quotas. These initial discussions were unsuccess-
ful. But until 1986, Norway had not conducted whaling operations that violated IWC quotas
and consequently no certification decisions were necessary.
87. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to President Ronald Reagan
(June 9, 1987).
88. Letter from President Reagan to Congress (Aug. 4, 1986).
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whales.89 After reviewing the program, the IWC Scientific Committee
submitted its report" to the IWC which adopted a non-binding resolu-
tion 91 stating that the research program did not satisfy the criteria speci-
fied in the 1986 resolution on special permits for scientific research and
the 1987 resolution on scientific research programs. The resolution con-
cluded that the research would not contribute information to rationally
manage the stock, would not facilitate the 1990 comprehensive assess-
ment, and did not address critically important research needs. The reso-
lution did not explicitly recommend that the research not take place, but
did incorporate by reference its 1987 resolution.
Following the 1988 IWC meeting, Norway announced that it would
take into account the comments of the IWC Scientific Committee con-
cerning its research program and would proceed to take 35 whales for
research purposes. The United States responded with an expression of
concern based on the possible need to examine Pelly Amendment obliga-
tions given Norway's apparent intent to engage in a scientific research
program that was not endorsed by the IWC. As a result, the United
States and Norway entered into bilateral discussions of Norway's research
program.
During the discussions U.S. and Norwegian officials addressed Nor-
way's research program and how it might be better defined and clarified
so as to respond to IWC concerns. U.S. obligations under the Pelly
Amendment were also discussed. Extensive documentation of the Norwe-
gian whale research program not presented to the IWC Scientific Com-
mittee was received and reviewed by U.S. officials and scientists. Based
on these discussions and review of Norwegian documentation of the re-
search program, U.S. scientists concluded that the research program ap-
peared to be a sound approach to Norwegian objectives of studying the
ecosystem in which the minke whales resided.
Following these discussions the Secretary of Commerce, on August
31, 1988, reported to the President that the taking of whales in conjunc-
tion with the Norwegian research program did not diminish the effective-
ness of the IWC conservation program and therefore another certification
was not warranted.9 2 The Secretary of Commerce further reported that
trade sanctions pursuant to the 1986 certification were unwarranted. In
reaching these conclusions, the Secretary cited the bilateral discussions
and the conclusions of U.S. scientists, concerning the clarified Norwegian
research program. In addition, the Secretary stated that the IWC Scien-
tific Committee noted that the proposed take of minke whales would have
only a negligible impact on the stock, and therefore, would not cause a
significant impact on the environment. The Secretary further concluded
89. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee, 40th Mtg. (1988).
90. Id.
91. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg., para. 33 (1988). See also, supra note 73.
92. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(Aug. 31, 1988).
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that it was vital to keep fully involved in the IWC process those countries
that have a tradition of or a future interest in whaling.
4. Republic of Korea
In 1986, the Republic of Korea (Korea) along with Iceland became
the first countries to be considered for certification for the taking of
whales for purposes of scientific research. Korea submitted to the Scien-
tific Committee at the 1985 IWC annual meeting its proposal to kill 200
minke whales for purposes of scientific research in 1986.93 The Scientific
Committee found that the proposed research program did not comply
with request for information requirements found in Paragraph 30 of the
IWC Schedule.9 4 The IWC, however, took no formal action in 1985 re-
garding Korea's research proposal.
After the 1985 IWC meeting, the United States requested Korea to
refrain from research whaling until after the 1986 IWC meeting in order
to allow Korea to submit a revised research proposal to the Scientific
Committee for another review. Korea submitted a revised research pro-
gram that called for the killing of 160 minke whales to the 1986 IWC
Scientific Committee meeting. "5 The Scientific Committee again con-
cluded that the proposal did not comply with Paragraph 30 of the IWC
Schedule because no detailed research program had been presented for
review."6 Again, the IWC took no formal action against Korea regarding
its scientific research proposal.
After the 1986 IWC meeting, Korea began taking whales pursuant to
the research proposal. Upon learning this, the U.S. government conveyed
to Korea its concern about Korea's decision to proceed without having
provided adequate information to the Scientific Committee for review.
The United States also expressed concern that Korea was taking whales
from a protection stock of minke whales and was using cold grenade
harpoons which were banned by the IWC in 1983. Following discussions
with Korean officials, during which the possibility of certification under
the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments was raised, Korea de-
cided to suspend any further taking of whales for scientific research until
the end of the 1987 IWC annual meeting.
Korea submitted another revised research proposal at the 1987 IWC
annual meeting.9 7 This time the proposal was reviewed by the Scientific
Committee which expressed serious uncertainties about the research pro-
93. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg. (1985); Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report
of the Scientific Committee, 36th Mtg. (1986).
94. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg., para. 4 (1985) See Report of the Scientific
Committee, 1985, RIWC 36:30-55 (1986).
95. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 38th Mtg., para. 21 (1986) See Report of the Scientific
Committee, 1986, RIWC 37:28-60 (1987).
96. Id.
97. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para. 5 (1987).
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gram in its report to the IWC.9s After considering the Scientific Commit-
tee Report, the IWC adopted a non-binding resolution stating that the
proposed take of whales pursuant to the research program "did not sat-
isfy the criteria set forth in the 1986 Resolution on Special Permits for
Scientific Research in that it has not contributed information which will
answer any significant management questions and the proposed take will
not materially facilitate the conduct of the Comprehensive Assessment."99
Following the conclusion of the 1987 IWC meeting, Korea announced that
it would not take any whales pursuant to its research program.
5. Iceland
At the 1985 IWC annual meeting, Iceland presented a four year re-
search program which called for the lethal take of fin, sei and minke
whales. 00 The original proposal called for catches of 80 fin, 40 sei and 80
minke whales for each of the 1986-1989 seasons, although Iceland has
modified its research program in each year since 1986.101
The Secretary of Commerce has considered possible certification of
Iceland for conducting its research program in 1986, 1987 and 1988. The
United States, however, has refrained from certifying Iceland in all cases
as discussed below.
a. 1986 Research Program
The Scientific Committee reviewed Iceland's original research propo-
sal in 1985 and the 1986 component again in 1986.0 s Uncertainties about
the research program were expressed by some members of the Scientific
Committee.'"3 The IWC, however,took no action regarding the Icelandic
program although, it did adopt the 1986 resolution establishing criteria
for scientific research permits. 04
Following the 1986 meeting, Iceland began its research program.
Shortly thereafter, the United States became concerned about Iceland's
commitment to adhere to one of the recommendations in the 1986 resolu-
tion on scientific research permits regarding local consumption of whale
meat and products taken pursuant to the research permit. That recom-
mendation states that whale "meat as well as other products should be
98. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para. 4 (1987).
99. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para. 44 (1987).
100. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg., para. 20 (1985); See Report of Scientific
Committee, 1985, RIWC 36:31-32 (1986).
101. Most notably, Iceland has declined to take any minke whales for all three years.
102. See Report of the Scientific Committee, 1985, RIWC 36:31-32 (1986); and Report
of the Scientific Committee, 1986, RIWC 37:28 (1987).
103. Id.
104. The 1986 resolution on scientific research permits, as contrasted with the 1987
resolution, did not recommend that the IWC should formally comment on the program or
the Scientific Committee's review of the program.
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utilized primarily for local consumption."' 5 As a result, the United States
and Iceland entered into discussions about the proper interpretation and
adherence to that recommendation.
Iceland indicated that it interpreted the recommendation to mean
that a country conducting scientific whaling should consume domestically
a large percentage of the total weight of all whale products generated by
the research. Thus, Iceland felt justified in exporting 90% of the whale
meat produced by research. United States officials considered whether
this interpretation, if carried out, would justify certification under the
Pelly Amendment' 8 on grounds that exporting more than 50 percent of
the whale meat as well as other whale products violated the consensus
interpretation of the recommendation concerning local consumption. The
United States communicated these concerns to Iceland. Iceland, finally
agreed not to export more than 49% of whale meat as well as other whale
products produced by research whaling. Based on this assurance, the Sec-
retary of Commerce decided not to certify Iceland under the Pelly
Amendment. Iceland ended up taking 76 fin and 40 sei whales during its
1986 research program.0 7
b. 1987 Research Program
Iceland renewed its intent to conduct its 1987 research whaling pro-
gram at the 1987 Scientific Committee meeting and submitted a progress
report for the 1986 research.' 8 Again, certain members of the Scientific
Committee expressed uncertainties about the program which were in-
cluded in the report submitted to the main body of the IWC.'0 9 That
same year, as discussed above, the IWC adopted a resolution adding crite-
ria for the review of scientific research programs and calling for the coun-
tries whose research programs are found not to meet applicable criteria to
refrain from issuing scientific research permits."'
After considering the Scientific Committee report, the IWC adopted
a non-binding resolution"' stating that the Icelandic research program
did not fully meet the criteria of the 1986 resolution concerning scientific
research permits. The resolution further recommended that Iceland re-
voke and refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals for scientific
research until uncertainties identified in the Scientific Committee Report
105. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 38th Mtg., para. 28 (1986).
106. Although Iceland was a party to a governing international fishery agreement with
the United States, thereby making it eligible for fishing allocations under the Magnuson
Act, it had not received any allocations. Accordingly, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
certification was not at issue.
107. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg. (1987).
108. Id.; see also Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 13, 16 (1987).
109. Report of the Scientific Committee, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para.
4 (1987).
110. See supra note 50.
111. International Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg. (1987). See supra note 73.
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have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Scientific Committee.
Following the 1987 IWC meeting, Iceland indicated that it fully in-
tended to carry out its research program despite the IWC resolution rec-
ommending otherwise. The United States communicated to Iceland that
if it did so, the United States would have to consider certification under
the Pelly Amendment. Before beginning the research program, Iceland
agreed to discuss the matter with U.S. officials.
Officials from both countries met in July and September, 1987 to dis-
cuss the research program and possible certification of Iceland. As a re-
sult of these discussions, the Secretary of Commerce agreed, in an ex-
change of letters with Iceland's Charge d'Affaires, not to certify Iceland
for its whaling research in 1987; and thereafter, if Iceland limited the tak-
ing to 80 fin and 20 sei whales, submitted its future research programs for
review by the IWC Scientific Committee and carried out the scientific
recommendations of that Committee." 2 Iceland completed its research
program in 1987 by taking 80 fin and 20 sei whales.113
c. 1988 Research Program
At the 1988 IWC Scientific Committees meeting, Iceland submitted a
revised 1988 scientific research program as well as reports on results of
the 1987 program. " The 1988 program again called for the lethal take of
80 fin and 20 sei whales. After its review, the Scientific Committee for-
warded its report," 6 which again included uncertainties expressed by
some members of the Committee, to the main body of the IWC. The IWC
adopted a non-binding resolution,"' by consensus, that stated that Ice-
land's research program did not satisfy each of the criteria in both the
1986 resolution on special permits for scientific research and the 1987 res-
olution on scientific programmes.
Shortly after the 1988 IWC meeting representatives of the United
112. The agreement was structured as follows:
1. For 1988, and thereafter, Iceland would submit its research program for re-
view by the Scientific Committee and would carry out the scientific recommen-
dations of that Committee.
2. The United States would not certify Iceland for the 80 fin whales and 20 sei
whales taken in 1987, nor for whales taken subsequently in the Icelandic pro-
gram for scientific research, so long as Iceland complies with the first
condition.
3. The United States will work with Iceland and other IWC commissioners to
review and make recommendations regarding the structure of the IWC Scien-
tific Committee's process for the review of research permits, so as to build con-
fidence in that process and is scientific basis.
113. Report of the Scientific Committee, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg., para.
4 (1988).
114. Id. at 51-62.
115. Report of the Scientific Committee, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg., para.
4 (1988).
116. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg. (1988). See supra note 73.
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States and Iceland met to discuss Iceland's research program and the pos-
sibility of responding to concerns of the some members of the Scientific
Committee and improving the program in light of those concerns. Based
on these discussion, Iceland significantly modified and improved its re-
search program and reduced the number of fin whales it planned to take
80 to 68 and the number of sei whales from 20 to 10. Iceland had decided
not to take any minke whales. It also indicated its intention to provide
information at the 1989 IWC meeting of the Scientific Committee on cer-
tain specific issues in order to address the uncertainties about its research
program identified by some members of the Committee.
Given these factors the Secretary of Commerce concluded as follows
in a letter to attorneys for certain environmental groups who had re-
quested that the Secretary certify Iceland:
In my view the modifications made by Iceland in its research program
represent a constructive response to the IWC non-binding resolution.
Moreover, it is my judgment that the effectiveness of the IWC conser-
vation program is better served by keeping Iceland fully involved in
the IWC process rather than by risking alienation of Iceland by certi-
fying it for continuing its research program in the face of a non-bind-
ing resolution of the IWC. I would note, in this regard, that it is far
from clear that certifying Iceland now would induce it to eliminate the
lethal components of its research whaling program. Alienating Iceland
from the IWC, on the other had, would remove the restraining influ-
ence exerted by the IWC on Iceland's whaling activities . . . . For
these reasons, I have determined that Iceland's decision to proceed
with its research whaling program, as modified in response to the
IWC's non-binding resolution, does not diminish the effectiveness of
the International Whaling convention or the IWC's conservation pro-
gram. Consequently, certification of Iceland under the Pelly Amend-
ment is unwarranted at this time." 7
The Secretary of Commerce's decision not to certify Iceland has been
challenged by the same environmental groups to whom the Secretary
wrote the above comments in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 18
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of certification decisions and sanctions over the last sev-
enteen years reveals that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ments have been used as both sticks and carrots to encourage whaling
nations to comply with the ICRW. These decisions, particularly in the
last few years, have been measured responses designed to address specific
problems without sacrificing overreaching policies and objectives of the
117. Letter from Acting Secretary of Commerce Donna Tuttle to the law firm Arnold &
Porter (July 15, 1988).
118. Greenpeace, U.S.A. et al. v. Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce, No. 88-
2158 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 3, 1988).
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ICRW and its conservation program. In each case of actual or potential
certification of countries for whaling practices, the offending country has
taken positive steps towards compliance with IWC conservation goals. At
this time, all member nations of the IWC are abiding by a complete mor-
atorium on commercial whaling despite objections lodged by the major
whaling countries. Those nations that are engaging in scientific research
whaling, all of which have been considered for certification or certified
based on their research activities, have continued to submit their pro-
grams to the IWC Scientific Committee for review and have made modifi-
cations in response to uncertainties about the programs raised by mem-
bers of the Scientific Committee. Moreover these countries all remain
involved in the IWC process and subject to its influence. Given the his-
tory of certification decisions and the present status of international
whaling, the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments unquestion-
ably have had a salutary effect on the ability of the IWC to achieve its
conservation objectives.

